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  While there are numerous determinants of successful economic sanctions 
in academia, the scholars of nuclear proliferation suggest that the same 
conditions will not be applied in sanctions intended for counter-proliferation 
due to the extremity and high uncertainty of the theme. In this research, the 
author attempts to verify the connection between sanctions and nuclear 
proliferation by arguing that five determinants (target’s economic capacity, 
economic interdependence, sanction’s multilateral nature, duration, and the 
diversified proliferation motives) affect the efficacy of nuclear sanction 
regimes. An empirical analysis of the 27 cases of proliferation attempts, seven 
sets of counter-proliferation sanctions, and case studies on North Korea and 
India indicate that two of the initial determinants display significant influence 
over the outcome of nuclear sanctions. The results of the research suggest 
that the target’s lower level of economic integration to international commerce, 
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Throughout the 1980-1990s, economic sanctions have been one of the 
most popular diplomatic policy tools. Such popularity came from their non-
violent nature of achieving a foreign policy objective without the use of military 
forces that can be burdensome in terms of both resources and politics.1 Even 
in the wake of skepticism over sanctions in the 21st century, there are 
approximately 8,000 sanctions targets imposed by the US government, with 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) maintaining 14 sanctions 
regimes for various purposes.2 The flexibility of economic sanctions is 
another source of its high popularity, with the applications ranging from 
narcotics trafficking, terrorism, to regional conflict resolutions. However, 
sanctions have been particularly prevalent in nuclear nonproliferation. 
Economic sanctions on the nations not abiding by the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are considered nearly as default 
options. In the US, Symington and Glenn amendments of the Arms Export 
Control Act mandated the ban of all US economic assistance and export 
credits to the nuclear proliferating states. Likewise, all the non-authorized 
nuclear weapon states pursuing a nuclear weapon program were subject to 
financial coercion, with the exception of Israel. 
 
1 Jesse Helms, “What Sanctions Epidemic?” Foreign Affairs, 78 (1), (1999), pp.2-8. 
2 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List 
(SDN) Human Readable Lists,” Resource Center, (Feb 2020); U.S. Department of Treasury, 
“Consolidated Sanctions List Data Files,” Resource Center, (Feb 2020); United Nations 




Contrary to their widespread usage, however, numerous practitioners and 
scholars from the security and economic sectors criticize the efficacy of 
sanctions. In fact, scholars like Galtung and Pape have even questioned the 
very definition of ‘success’ in sanctions usage,3 undermining the claims from 
the pro-sanctions school of thought. This prevalent skepticism applies to the 
nuclear-related economic coercion as well. Only four of the previous counter-
proliferation sanctions successfully induced the target to renounce its nuclear 
development.4 Hence, because most cancellations of nuclear weapons 
programs and disarmaments involve direct / indirect military pressure5 or a 
dramatic collapse of the original owner state,6 the efficacy of coercive 
diplomacy in a nuclear crisis is questioned by practitioners and scholars alike. 
The unsuccessful outcome of economic coercion is also observed in one of 
the most recent cases in the nuclear nonproliferation issue, North Korea. Ever 
since its first nuclear crisis in 1992-1994, the US and international 
organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been 
imposing political and economic pressures to renounce the North Korean 
pursuit of a nuclear weapon.7 Although there are endless debates on the 
 
3 Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, 
No. 3, (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or 
Completely Empty?” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65. 
4 Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria 
5 Iraq involving direct military intervention and Libya involving indirect military pressure 
6 Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa related to Soviet Union’s 
collapse 
7 Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the 
Case of North Korea,” Stanford University Press, (2017), pp. 16. 
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approaches and assumptions in persuading Pyongyang, most practitioners 
and scholars agree that the combination of political and economic efforts 
encompassing numerous nations and international bodies failed its mission. 
As of now, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a non-
authorized nuclear state under the NPT, acquiring sufficient plutonium 
production for a weapons project back in 2004,8 along with the missile sized 
warheads in 2016.9 According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)’s 
assessment, the DPRK is also estimated to have developed a nuclear-
capable Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 2018.10 
In this context, this research examines what the most significant 
determinants for a successful nuclear counter-proliferation sanction regime 
are. Because the research focuses on sanctions as coercive diplomacy, not 
as the direct means to prevent nuclear technology acquisition, the study 
concentrates its scope on the determinants on the demand-side.11 Prior to the 
primary analysis, however, the research demonstrates a literature review of 
 
8 Graham Allison, “Global Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Nuclear Proliferation: Risk 
and Responsibility,ed. Allison et al., A Report to the Trilateral Commission: 60, (2006), pp.1-
25. 
9 Anna Fifield, “North Korea conducts fifth nuclear test, claims it has made warheads with 
‘higher strike power’,” The Washington Post, (9 Sep 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-conducts-fifth-nuclear-test-as-regime-
celebrates-national-holiday/2016/09/08/9332c01d-6921-4fe3-8f68-c611dc59f5a9_story.html. 
10 Warrick, Nakashima and Fifield, “North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, 








two core concepts related to the theme: nuclear proliferation, and economic 
coercion. The methods section after the literature review introduces the 
adopted research methods and describes how each specific method 
contributes to a deeper comprehension of the agenda. Hence, the definition of 
‘successful nuclear sanctions’ within this research will be clarified in this 
chapter. 
The primary data section covers two agendas: an overview of the economic 
sanctions in search of nuclear nonproliferation, and the analysis of 
determinants of the successful nonproliferation sanction regime. The first part 
examines the counter-proliferation sanctions and determinants using a 
quantitative approach (multivariate regression), and the second part examines 
the significant contributors in detail. This qualitative explanation is conducted 
using a cross-case case study method. Further descriptions will be provided 
in the methods section. 
Finally, the discussion chapter presents how the findings from this research 
contribute to the existing academic collections, along with the limitations found 




i) Literature on Nuclear Proliferation 
Ever since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there have been countless 
pieces of literature on why nations seek these weapons and what significance 
they hold in international politics. If one hopes to seize a nuclear proliferation 
attempt through the economic coercion, the coercer must understand the 
rationale behind the target’s nuclear pursuit. Among the studies that are 
elaborate on the reasons for nuclear development, Sagan suggests three 
models that can set the basis for the demand-side proliferation debate: 
security model, domestic politics model, and norms model.12 Likewise, this 
part of the literature review examines pieces of literature falling under the 
three models of nuclear proliferation.  
 
Security Model 
The first model for demand-side proliferation is the security model. This 
model comes from the political neorealist school of ideas, which claims that 
every nation is bound to self-responsible national security and sovereignty 
due to the anarchical nature of the international system.13 According to the 
security model’s perspective, the massive power of the nuclear weapons will 
 
12 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 54-86. 
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” New York, Random House, (1979); 
Hans j. Morgenthau, and Kenneth W. Thompson, “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace.” McGraw-Hill, Sixth Edition, (1985), pp. 3-13. 
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induce any nations that encounter a nuclear-armed rival state or massive 
threat from conventional force disadvantage to seek nuclear capacity or 
measures with equivalent impacts. Because of this, nations with capability will 
pursue nuclear weapons development, and those without the capability will 
form a nuclear alliance with existing nuclear power under the security model’s 
logic. As a result, measures to lower the insecurities, such as protective 
nuclear guarantees, extended deterrence, or negative security assurance, can 
promote nonproliferation in the short term. However, as “proliferation begets 
proliferation,”14 it is assessed that nonproliferation efforts can delay the 
proliferation but cannot completely prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.15 
Aside from Sagan’s framework, some earlier scholars also strived to 
analyze states’ nuclear intentions, such as Epstein. Epstein’s claims on the 
security model, or what he called ‘Military Security,’ suggests that the impacts 
of the nuclear arms are so significant that all nations will be seeking for 
suitable alternatives within their power capacities. This study also shares the 
idea that states with more power will pursue their own nuclear weapons 
programs, whereas the weaker ones will strive for a hegemonic ally that will 
provide nuclear deterrence. In the later part, Epstein recommends five 
disincentives against potential proliferators: positive nuclear protection 
guarantees, negative security assurances, nuclear states being responsible 
 
14 George P. Schultz, “Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” US Department of 
State, Current Policy No. 631, (29 Nov 1984), pp. 18. 
15 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 57-63. 
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for NPT disarmament obligations, being provided conventional military 
capacities, and maintaining a strong force in the hands of the UNSC for both 
the conventional / nuclear deterrence. Hence, Epstein, as well as Sagan, 
asserts that national security is the core rationale behind nuclear 
proliferation.16 
Waltz partially contributes to this discussion by illustrating the significance 
of nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence. Waltz first points that the notion of 
‘deterrence’ has existed long before the advent of nuclear technology and that 
deterrence used to be more strategy-based rather than a specific weapon-
based in the previous stages. Nevertheless, he analyzes that the nuclear 
weapons reversed the existing equations because the significance of nuclear 
arms derives more from their existence itself, rather than from the strategies 
to utilize them.17 In addition, Waltz even comments that nuclear weapons 
severely undermine the significance of conventional forces by nullifying their 
roles in nuclear nations’ collisions over vital interests.18 Likewise, it can be 
inferred that nations strive to acquire nuclear weapons for the strategic 
security advantage over conventional weapons, which can only be mitigated 
by the procuring nuclear weapons capacity. 
Another piece of important research is Singh and Way’s ‘The Correlates of 
 
16 William Epstein, “Why States Go and Don’t Go Nuclear,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 430, (Mar 1977), pp. 16-28. 
17 Bernard Brodie, “War and Politics,” New York: MacMillan, (1973). 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, (Sep 1990), pp. 731-745. 
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Nuclear Proliferation.’ In this study, the authors categorize proliferation factors 
into three sets: external determinants, domestic determinants (both demand-
side factors), and technological determinants (supply-side factor). Using the 
multi-nominal logit model, the research identifies that external threats and 
economic developments are the most influential factors in developing nuclear 
arms. Specifically, GDP per capita, industrial capacity index, and the 
involvement in the world economy were accounted to be significant correlates 
among the economic factors. The authors also comment that while high 
economic interdependence can dissuade some potential proliferators, the 
direct financial coercion or incentives are not major determinants, as observed 
from the limited range of influence of sanctions applied to India and 
Pakistan.19 
Finally, Roth adds to the security model. He suggests that from the 
neorealist view, smaller adversaries of a superpower will seek to acquire 
nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes out of their robust deterrence 
effects even with a small number of nuclear forces. Yet, he concludes that the 
security model cannot predict the outcome of proliferation attempts, despite its 
identification of states’ intent, because it does not account for domestic level 
factors that lead to policy decisions.20 
 
 
19 Singh and Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec 2004), pp.859-885. 
20 Roth, and Krieger, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” International Studies Review, 




Domestic Politics Model 
The next model discussed is the domestic politics model. This model 
concentrates on the role of domestic actors in influencing a nation’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. Sagan suggests three main components of the domestic 
politics model: politicians seeking public support, military leaders, and atomic 
scientists. He analyzes that nuclear proliferation is highly likely when the three 
actors align their search of nuclear weapons pursuit, eventually acquiring full 
control over the nation’s government. This theory emphasizes that the role of 
bureaucrats can sometimes be more than merely complying with the 
decisions made from their leadership. Instead, it proposes that this 
bureaucratic coalition exerts influence on the leadership and public’s 
perception of the cost and benefit of going nuclear. Furthermore, this article 
states a number of policy recommendations, including limiting the military 
expenditure of potential proliferator through conditional loans, reinforcing 
civilian control of the military, and providing alternative sources of employment 
for the internal components of proliferation.21 
Lavoy is another advocate of the domestic politics model. In his literature, 
Lavoy recognizes the security and norms model but evaluates that security 
and normative factors possess empirical and logical weakness, failing to 
explain the strategic logic and politics behind nuclear weapons programs. In 
 
21 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 63-73. 
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contrast, the research states that the national elites determined to develop 
nuclear arms highlight the security threat imposed on the nation repeatedly, to 
promote a firm belief among the public that nuclear arms capacity can grant 
them with military security and political sovereignty.22 
Solingen further develops Lavoy’s argument in her study, ‘The domestic 
Sources of Nuclear Posture.’ She argues that the expansion of democracy 
and international economic integration has divided the industrializing states 
into two groups: those who pursue domestic support through economic 
liberalization, and the opposers of global integration. With this distinction, 
Solingen suggests that when dealing with ‘fence-sitting’ states, potential 
proliferators who are sitting on the edge of the nuclear arms programs with 
the capacity to cross the fence according to their willingness, the heavy 
financial pressure should not be applied if the fence-sitter belongs to the 
liberalization group. This is because the external threats make the domestic 
conditions unsuitable for the liberalizers to maintain internal support, thus 
making proliferation more likely. The research also mentions that domestic 
actors would be highly hesitant to dissuade the public from denuclearization 
by disclosing the actual cost and benefit of the nuclear arms. As the “Nuclear 
Myths” of ensured security and nationalism compensate the politicians with 
robust public support, the governing faction will not be motivated to give up 
this political advantage. Finally, Solingen remarks that since these domestic 
sources play an immense role in the proliferation among rogue nations like 
 
22 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies, 
2:3-4, (1993), pp. 192-212, DOI: 10.1080/09636419309347524 
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North Korea, an analysis of each rogue state’s internal dynamics will 
contribute to the counter-proliferation efforts.23 
In her later works, such as ‘Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation,’ 
Solingen further refines her assertions on the domestic sources of nuclear 
arms. The book specifies the previous two groups of industrializing nations 
into ‘Internationalizing’ and ‘Inward looking’ models of political survival. Then, 
Solingen moves on to comment that the Inward looking leaders who seek 
economic nationalism, or rigid ethnic / religious values tend to use nuclear 
weapons as a mechanism to persuade the public, claiming that nuclear arms 
acquisition is a step towards modernization as well as a deterrent against 
hegemonic oppressors. On the contrary, as the Internationalizing model is 
more susceptible to economic influence such as sanctions and inducements, 
it performed the role of self-deterrent, significantly limiting nuclear arms 
attempts from the nations belonging to this model.24 
 
Norms Model 
The third model analyzing the demand-side proliferation motive is the 
norms model. According to Sagan, once again, this model interprets that a 
state’s decisions originate from norms and beliefs about what each nation 
 
23 Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing ‘Fence-sitters’ in 
the Post-Cold War Era,” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 8, (Oct 
1998). 
24 Etel Solingen, “Introduction: the domestic distributional effects of sanctions and positive 
inducements,” in Sanctions Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, ed. Etel Solingen, 
Cambridge University Press, (2012), pp. 3-28. 
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considers as legitimate behavior according to its relative international position. 
From this perspective, a nation’s pursuit of nuclear weapons programs may 
reflect its leader’s perception of an appropriate response to its historical and 
geopolitical conditions. Another implication from the norms model is that from 
the sociological view; high tech military capacity such as nuclear weapons can 
be considered as a sign of modernization. Like airlines, nuclear power plants, 
or international sports teams, certain countries may aspire to acquire nuclear 
arms, as they are a symbol of national advancement.25 
Epstein states that political prestige is another driving force behind why 
some nations proliferate. According to Epstein, some leaders and elites 
believe that nuclear arms promote national prestige and reserve a higher 
international position. He suggests nations such as the UK, France, China, 
and India, who went after nuclear weapons programs to maintain the status of 
great power. This research also asserts that other prestige related objectives 
of nuclear proliferation include assuring a significant voice in international 
organizations, redressing one’s peripheral condition in the international 
hierarchy, and validating sovereignty against the hegemonic powers.26 
As for another perspective regarding the norms model, Chafetz, Abramson, 
and Grillot introduce role theory. The role theory argues that a perceived 
 
25 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 73-85. 
26 William Epstein, “Why States Go And Don’t Go Nuclear,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 430, Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, 
Problems, and Proposals, (Mar 1977), pp. 16-28. 
13 
 
position of each nation in its security environment creates ‘role conception,’ an 
international expectation of the state’s role. This role conception influences 
the public and bureaucrats’ assessments on what decisions a nation makes to 
a given circumstance. Using this role theory, the article analyzes that the 
Ukraine is likely to invest in nuclear weapons technology, whereas Belarus is 
less likely to do so. This study also makes evaluations of why rogue nations 
like Pakistan and North Korea proliferate, even withstanding the political and 
economic pressures from the international society. The authors analyze that 
the role conception of these two states is ‘the rebels against imperial 
aggressors,’ one against India and the other against Western powers, 
respectively.27 
Hymans adds more insights to the discussion of the norms and conceptions 
by suggesting the notion of ‘National Identity Conception’ (NIC). According to 
his literature ‘The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation,’ NIC is “an individual’s 
understanding of the nation’s identity – his or her sense of what the nation 
naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands…”28 Likewise, NIC is 
highly similar to the previous concept of ‘role conception,’ but with the analysis 
level of individuals. In addition, Hymans poses four types of NIC using two 
dimensions: status perception, where a leader identifies the nation to be 
superior to others or inferior to others, and solidarity perception if the person 
 
27 Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and 
Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Political Psychology, Vol. 
17, No. 4, (Dec 1996), pp. 727-757. 
28 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and 
Foreign Policy,” Cambridge University Press, (2006). 
14 
 
interprets ‘us’ and the rest of the world to be in a conflict-relationship or not. 
As a result, the four types of NIC are: ‘Sportsmanlike nationalist,’ 
‘Sportsmanlike subaltern,’ ‘Oppositional nationalist,’ and ‘Oppositional 
subaltern.’ After assessing the NICs of nine leaders from four nations (France, 
Australia, Argentina, and India), the book concludes that the ‘Oppositional 
nationalist’ type of NIC, the one which tends to consider the nation to be 
superior to others, and counts the others to be against ‘us,’ are more prone to 
seek nuclear arms programs. Out of this observation, Hymans offers a 
number of policy implications at the end of the literature. First, from the 
demand-side perspective, he anticipates that neither economic / political 
restraints from the community of existing nuclear states will persuade the 
proliferators to denounce nuclear pursuit. Rather he claims that due to the 
leaders’ likely NIC type, imposing non-existential threats may even solidify 
their nuclear decisions. On the other hand, hymans shows a positive attitude 
toward the preventative war alternative. This is because a preventative war 
represents a massive threat to the state’s leadership, such as the regime 
change. Nevertheless, he concludes that the preventative war, too, is highly 
unlikely to be successful due to the moral concerns, costs, and implications of 
shared burdens among international society.29 
  
 
29 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and 
Foreign Policy,” Cambridge University Press, (2006). 
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ii) Literature on Economic Sanctions 
The popularity of sanctions began in the 1960s; however, the history of 
economic coercions dates back to as early as the days of World War I. Just 
like the nuclear proliferation literature, academic theories on economic means 
in coercive diplomacy transformed over time, and so did its preference among 
policymakers. As mentioned in the introduction, most pieces of literature 
examined in this portion are written after the 1970s, throughout the economic 
sanctions’ prime days into the rise of skepticism over them. This section 
reviews the pro-sanctions school of scholars, scholars who question its 
effectiveness, and articles on crisis-related economic coercion. 
However, we need to study the purposes and features of this economic 
coercion, for a better understanding of the sanctions-debate before going 
further. On this, Galtung offers a decent guiding point by introducing ‘the 
general theory of economic sanctions’ that defines the economic sanctions as 
actions involving financial pressure with one or more senders and receivers 
“with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them 
of some value and / or make the receivers comply with certain norms the 
senders deem important.”30 This indicates that sanctions at the time were 
also used to inflict pain on the target for its previous behaviors. However, 
Galtung denounces the punishment aspect and zeros the discussion into 
measures that induce other international actors to comply. To summarize, the 
logic leading to compliance is as follows: economic damage leads to 
 
30 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 379. 
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economic disintegration, which causes political disintegration. This political 
instability will then force the target’s leadership to comply.31 
Baldwin is another scholar who made an immense contribution to the 
comprehension of economic tools in the foreign policy settings. In his book 
‘Economic Statecraft,’ Baldwin emphasizes that state affairs encompass both 
the domestic and foreign side of the governmental decisions, indicating that 
utilizing economic measures should not be considered inappropriate because 
they are applied for diplomatic purposes. He claims that there is a limited 
understanding of the financial tools as statecraft compared to military or 
diplomatic measures that have been favored by the nation-states for an 
extensive period. To clarify, the book summarizes three central aspects of 
economic statecraft: policy instrument (financial tools), domain (one or more 
target states), and scope (any component of the target’s decision such as 
behaviors, norms, beliefs, etc.). One significant difference between Baldwin 
and Galtung’s view is that Baldwin's definition is broader as he considers any 
alterations, including even the invisible factors like norms and beliefs, to be 
the goal of economic statecraft.32 
  
 
31 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
32 David A. Baldwin, “Economic Statecraft,” Princeton University Press, (1985). 
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Supporters of Economic Sanctions 
Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg’s (referred to as HSE since Oegg was 
added in the third edition) work ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ is the 
initiator that incited the applications of economic sanctions in foreign policy. 
This research reviews 204 case studies of economic sanctions used from 
1914 to 2006 (as of the third edition), to assess their outcomes and verify the 
economic sanctions’ efficacy as a policy tool. The authors define the five 
objectives of sanctions: 1) moderate changes in the target behavior, 2) 
destabilization of the target, 3) prevention of minor military movement, 4) 
undermining the military capacity of the target, and 5) significant changes in 
the target policy. Along with these, HSE suggests the scale for policy 
outcomes and sanctions’ contribution to the result, both ranging from 1 
(lowest) to 4 (highest). Using such standards, 34 percent of the 204 cases 
were analyzed to be successful, with approximately 30 percent of 
accomplishment rate under attempts of significant policy alteration (e.g., 
regime change attempts, impairing adversarial military). As for the 
recommendations, the following are the major policy implications: 1) sanctions 
are less effective when dealing with autocratic regimes with high economic 
power, 2) sanctions must be deployed with maximum impact to avoid the use 
of military, 3) a coalition of coercers does not guarantee the higher likelihood 
of successful, and 4) sanctions require the precise calculation of their costs 
and benefits to prevent the loss of coercer’s domestic support.33 
 
33 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg, “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Peterson 
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After HSE’s research, there were numerous studies, from both supporters 
and critics, regarding the efficacy of coercive diplomacy using economic 
measures. After a few rounds of questions on the agenda, Gibson, Davis, and 
Radcliff reassessed the successful applications and findings. The article 
examines the same set of case studies used by Hufbauer et al. (the cases 
from the second edition of the book, year from 1914 to 1989) with the logistic 
regression analysis method. On the contrary to its hypothesis, the paper 
identifies that the economic power level of the target state or the import / 
export dependency of the receiver on the sender did not exhibit significant 
influence in the successfulness of the economic coercion. Rather, the analysis 
proves that if the objective was to destabilize the target to incur a behavioral 
change, the most influential determinant in the success of sanctions is the 
target’s stability before the application of the sanctions. In addition, the 
authors comment that another major discovery is that the relative 
effectiveness of coercion displayed a downward trend as time goes on.34 
Coming back to Baldwin’s ideas, he proposes counter arguments as a 
response to the criticisms on his interpretation of economic sanctions and 
evaluation of success. First, Baldwin rebuts that the effectiveness of economic 
statecraft must be judged in a matter of degree, rather than distinguishing the 
success and failure according to compliance and non-compliance. Secondly, 
 
institute for International Economics, third edition, (2009). 
34 Dashti-Gibson, Davis, Radcliff, “On the Determinants of the Success of Economic 
Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, (Apr 
1997), pp. 608-618. 
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although the paper admits that there can be disputed views on the success 
rate of sanctions, it stresses that empirical verifications do not explain the 
logic of why the critics do not believe that sanctions work. In the end, the 
article concludes that the ‘failed’ economic coercion that critics suggest should 
be assessed in relative terms with other policy tools such as military or 
diplomatic measures, as well as in spectrum, not bipolar standard.35 
Elliott also responds to skepticism on her previous work with Hufbauer and 
Schott. In her later research ‘The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely 
Empty?’, Elliott provides more explanation on the rationale behind the initial 
study’s broad definition of economic sanctions. She claims that as economic 
pressure and military force are not exclusive, but supplements reinforcing 
each other, like different branches of military supporting each other in a joint 
operation. Likewise, she suggests that when economic and military measures 
are mingled, “some degree of success may be attributed to sanctions if they 
contributed at least modestly.” Hence, Elliott even comments that sanctions 
are not expected to produce significant outcomes when applied 
independently. Although Elliott does not evaluate sanctions to be completely 
ineffective, she points out a few determinants that influence the efficacy of 
economic coercion, such as economic interdependence, multilateral 
application, and level of enforcement.36 
 
35 Baldwin, and Pape, “Evaluating Economic Sanctions,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
(Fall 1998), pp. 189-198. 
36 Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” International 
Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65. 
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For more recent scholars, Kaempfer and Lowenberg support the 
effectiveness of the sanctions’ policy application. They first introduce three 
objectives of economic coercion: sanctions applied to please the domestic 
public of the sender’s side, sanctions to punish the target by inflicting damage, 
and sanctions to coerce a specific behavior. The authors imply that one case 
of sanctions may have all three goals at the same time. Moreover, this report 
claims that targeted sanctions or smart sanctions can be more effective in 
certain scenarios. Targeted sanctions are the type of economic coercion that 
aims for restraining the range of financial burden on specific proponents of the 
sanction receiver. Usually, these types of sanctions are applied to political 
groups, bureaucratic elites, or military organizations within the target nation to 
diminish the internal regime support and induce instability. Another benefit of 
this type of economic pressure is the moral high ground is minimizing harms 
inflicted on the target’s general public who do not have close linkage with the 
decision-making process. In the end, this article asserts that smart sanctions 
can be more effective than comprehensive sanctions when the imposer has 
adequate political, social, and economic information of the target. This is 




37 Kaempfer, and Lowenberg, “Targeted Sanctions: Motivating Policy Change,” Harvard 
International Review, (Fall 2007), pp. 68-72. 
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Critics of Economic Sanctions 
This portion of the literature review investigates the opinions of sanction 
critics. The critics are mainly divided into two groups, one arguing that 
economic coercion is not a valid policy tool at all, and the other claiming that 
the method only operates under a confined circumstance or those suggesting 
potential reinforcements to enhance the effectiveness. In reality, the stance of 
the latter may not be immensely different from the supporters aside from the 
degree perceived effectiveness of the economic sanctions. 
Returning to Galtung, he opposes the validity of economic sanctions’ 
foreign policy application from two rationales. First, Galtung considers the 
universality, one primary condition of economic coercion that necessitates 
support from most of the international society, to be implausible. Hence, even 
if the universal pressure was present, he anticipates an adverse impact of 
providing stimulus for internal integration, along with insignificant economic 
damage in nations with substantial domestic resources and economy. 
Moreover, the study suggests that countermeasures against sanctions will 
harshly undermine the pressures, even when all the conditions are met. For 
instance, states that consider themselves as a minority in the international 
order may collaborate to alleviate the coercive force, or potential targets will 
diversify their trading partners to minimize the risk of having their economy 
demolished by losing several trade partners.38 
 
38 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
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Robert Pape, one of the harshest critics of economic sanctions, denounce 
the successful cases as well as the definition of ‘successful sanctions.’ Pape 
introduces two criticisms of the existing pro-sanctions literature. He states that 
the broad definition of economic sanctions established by HSE overlaps with 
other types of financial measures in international politics like commercial 
negotiations, and economic warfare. Such a vague distinction not only leads 
to a limited understanding of sanctions, but it also leaves doubts in the case 
studies considered successful. The article also comments that an extensive 
definition of economic sanctions, such as that of Baldwin, causes type II 
hypothesis error of leaving hypothesis un-rejectable and unverifiable. Finally, 
the research points out that HSE failed to isolate the contribution of sanctions 
from that of military pressure. Pape highlights that nearly half of the cases 
introduced as the outcomes of successful sanctions were mixed 
consequences of economic and military influence, once again undermining 
the credibility of HSE’s research.39 
 
Crisis related Sanctions 
There are a few works of literature concentrated on the economic sanctions 
applied in crisis environments. Lektzian and Regan analyzed the efficacy of 
financial pressures in controlling the duration of civil conflicts using time-series 
cross-section analysis. The authors conclude that multilateral or institutional 
 
39 Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, 
No. 2, (Fall, 1997), pp. 90-136. 
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sanctions are more effective in enforcement mechanisms as well as 
maintaining the constant pressures, but military interventions were the 
decisive determinant in influencing the conflict period. Furthermore, the 
participation of hegemonic powers in both the economic coercion and military 
intervention was another major factor in the duration of civil conflict.40 
Miyagawa and Ohno examine the efficacy of economic sanctions in 
significantly altering the target’s behavior, especially in the process of nuclear 
proliferation. They calculate the expected damage of a hypothetical set of 
sanctions under multiple dependent variables to evaluate what scenarios are 
ideal for the economic coercion to acquire policy objectives. The paper 
suggests several findings from the analysis. First, if economic sanctions fail to 
inflict sufficient damage to halt the nuclear proliferation process, the attempt 
backfires by creating a domestic cohesion within the target. Hence, Miyagawa 
and Ohno also argue that sanctions are more likely to be effective in counter-
proliferation when they are applied in the initial stage of the target’s nuclear 
weapons program, and when the economic connection between the coercer 
and the receiver is high.41 
Finally, Stein analyzes the impact of utilizing financial measures, both the 
sanctions and inducements, to influence the outcome of nuclear proliferation. 
He asserts that the coercion intends to divide the opponent and acquire a 
 
40 Lektzian & Regan, “Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 53(4), (2016), pp. 554-568. 
41 Miyagawa and Ohno, “Nuclear Bombs and Economic Sanctions,” Southern Economic 
Journal, Vol. 82, No. 2, (Oct 2015), pp. 635-646. 
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political goal in exchange for financial capacity. In this process, the regime 
types of the sanctioner and the target are essential determinants because 
they determine the interaction procedures of how the states acquire supports 
from the domestic society. In this view, Stein comments that having a 
democratic coercer and an autocratic receiver makes the economic measures 
least likely to succeed. Moreover, he also mentions that though the market 
measures may be able to influence the target’s economy, such financial 
impact does not always correlate with the desired political effect.42 
Out of reviewing the existing literature, the research identified several major 
determinants, including: proliferation motives, economic status, leader’s NIC 
perception, domestic political stability prior to the sanctions’ application. 
However, the author found no consensus among these works on what factors 
contribute most significantly to successful nonproliferation sanctions. The 
remaining sections of this research strive to fill this gap of ‘What are the most 
important conditions for a successful counter-proliferation sanctions regime.’  
  
 
42 Aurther A. Stein, "Sanctions, inducements, and market power," in Sanctions Statecraft, and 




As the research sets five main determinants over the success of nuclear 
sanctions (economic capacity, economic interdependence, multilateral 
coercion, duration of the sanctions, and the proliferation motives; the 
definitions of each determinants are further explained in Appendix, [Table 1], 
“Five Determinants Explained”), the hypothesis suggests potential conditions 
for each contributing factor. This paper hypothesizes that the receiver’s high 
economic capacity, low level of integration to the global market, unilateral 
nature of the sanction, extended duration, and the diversified proliferation 
motives diminish the efficacy of the nonproliferation sanctions regime. 
 
Methods 
To distinguish the outcomes of each set of sanctions coherently, this 
research adopts Pape’s view, that the acquisition of political behavioral 
change in the target state should be the sole standard measuring the 
sanctions’ success. However, it is unrealistic to isolate the impacts of 
economic coercion from diplomatic and military influence in nonproliferation 
attempts, and there is a limited number of nuclear proliferation cases involving 
both the economic and military pressure. In this sense, any differences in the 
receiver’s behavior will be accounted for as sanctions’ influence.  
The quantitative analysis examines the efficacy of economic coercion in 
counter-proliferation using a multivariate regression model. The first set of 
regressions (Model 1-1, 1-2) uses records from 27 nations that sought nuclear 
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weapons programs in the past.43 
The second group of regression incorporates five determinants (economic 
capacity, economic interdependence, multilateral nature of the sanctions, 
duration of the sanctions, and proliferation motives) to evaluate the impact 
and statistical validity of nuclear sanctions. This analysis uses a subset of 
eight states from the previous list of 27 proliferators. These eight states were 
selected because the cases are proliferators who became the targets of 
nonproliferation sanctions according to the open-source data on 
nonproliferation attempts.44 
The qualitative analysis section uses a cross-dimensional case study 
method examining the set of nuclear sanctions on North Korea and India. 
These cases are selected because they coherently explain the statistically 
significant determinants (economic interdependence and diversified 
proliferation motives). 
 
43 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, South 
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; Graham Allison, “Global 
Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Nuclear Proliferation: Risk and Responsibility, ed. 
Allison et al., A Report to the Trilateral Commission: 60, (2006), pp.3, Figure1-1. (With the 
update of North Korean nuclear arms acquisition). 
44 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profiles”, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/, (assessed: 
22 Apr 2020); Sue E. Eckert, “United Nations nonproliferation sanctions,” International 
Journal, Winter 2009-2010, pp. 69-83. 
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Nuclear Sanctions: Quantitative Analysis 
Two sets of multivariate regression analyses were conducted to verify the 
efficacy of nonproliferation sanctions and the determinants. The first (Model 1-
1, 1-2) investigates the correlation between the presence of economic 
sanctions and military interventions (the independent variables), and the 
outcomes of 27 nuclear proliferation attempts (the dependent variable). 
 
[Model 1-1] Sanctions and Military on Nuclear Weapons Possession 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Nuclear Weapons Possession Status 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E. Significance  
Economic Sanctions 0.3871 0.1437 *** 
Military Intervention -0.3280 0.2087  
Constant 0.0699 0.0757  
Notes: Significance level parameter are denoted by *(p < .10), **(p < .05), ***(p < .01), ****(p < .001) 
 
[Model 1-2] Sanctions and Military on Nuclear Proliferation Indicator 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Nuclear Proliferation Indicator 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E. Significance  
Economic Sanctions 0.9677 0.2909 **** 
Military Intervention -0.0699 0.4227  
Constant 1.4247 0.1533 **** 
Notes: Significance level parameter are denoted by *(p < .10), **(p < .05), ***(p < .01), ****(p < .001) 
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Model 1-1 classifies the sanctions’ results according to the nuclear 
proliferation status of each target nation.45 In contrast, model 1-2 takes a 
more sophisticated approach of categorizing three developmental phases, 
according to Singh and Way’s “Indicators of Nuclear Proliferation.”46 The 
“Indicators of Nuclear Proliferation” was adopted to better assess the 
influence of sanctions and military interventions’ influence on the target’s 
proliferation willingness. The models indicate that the use of economic 
coercion exhibits a positive correlation with nuclear proliferation. This implies 
that using economic sanctions is not automatically associated with a higher 
likelihood of counter-proliferation. Rather military interventions were verified to 
be linked with a higher likelihood of nonproliferation. 
Although the initial set of analysis concludes that applying economic 
coercion on proliferators fails to stop their weapons programs, it does not 
provide any detailed implications on what conditions attribute to the 
nonproliferation sanctions’ efficacy. To follow up, the research conducts 




45 Graham Allison, “Global Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Nuclear Proliferation: Risk 
and Responsibility, ed. Allison et al., A Report to the Trilateral Commission: 60, (2006), pp.3, 
Figure1-1. (With the update of North Korean nuclear arms acquisition). 
46 Singh and Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec 2004), pp.865-867. (Again, North Korea updated as 
“First explosion” phase). 
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[Model 2-1] Sanction Determinants on Nuclear Weapons Possession 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Nuclear Weapons Possession Status 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E. Significance  
GDP 
(By $Billion) 
-0.0007 0.0003  
Economic Interdependence 
(Import + Export / GDP) 
-2.6980 0.2962 *** 
Multilateral Enforcement 
(Presence of Multilateral, 
Institutional Coercion) 
-0.1531 0.0843  
Duration of the Sanctions 
(By Year) 
-0.0156 0.0068  
Proliferation motive 
(Limited to security 
/ multiple purposes) 
-0.7276 0.1399 *** 
Constant 2.5095 0.1885 **** 





[Model 2-2] Sanction Determinants on Nuclear Proliferation Indicator 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Nuclear Proliferation Indicator 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E. Significance  
GDP 
(By $Billion) 
-0.0010 0.0012  
Economic Interdependence 
(Import + Export / GDP) 
-1.8677 1.4556  
Multilateral Enforcement 
(Presence of Multilateral / 
Institutional Coercion) 
0.0480 0.4145  
Duration of the Sanctions 
(By Year) 
-0.0584 0.0335  
Proliferation motive 
(Limited to security 
/ multiple purposes) 
-0.2798 0.6877  
Constant 4.1580 0.9268 *** 




The second group of regressions models verifies the correlation between 
the nuclear proliferation and the determinants introduced by existing literature 
on sanctions: target state’s economic capacity,47 target state’s dependence 
on the international economy,48 multilateral enforcement mechanism,49 
duration of the sanctions,50 and model of nuclear arms pursuit.51 To be more 
specific about the factors, GDP52 was employed as the standard to gauge the 
economic size of the targeted nations. For the level of economic 
interdependence, utilizing the ratio between the target’s export / import sum53 
and its GDP was adopted once again from Singh and Way’s study,54 and the 
duration of the sanctions is measured by year. Lastly, the proliferation motive 
is whether the motivation source is limited to the external security model. If 
 
47 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
48 Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” International 
Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65. 
49 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
50 Biersteker & Bergeijk, “How and When do Sanctions work? The Evidence,” in On target? 
EU sanctions as security policy tools, ed. Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, (2015), pp. 15-28. 
51 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 57-63. 
52 World Bank, “GDP (Current US$),” Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, (assessed 11 Mar 2020); CIA, 
“Economy: Korea, North,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/kn.html, (assessed 12 Mar 2020); Country Economy, “GDP,” Data: 
Government, https://countryeconomy.com/gdp, (assessed 12 Mar 2020). 
53 Barbieri & Keshk, “International Trade: 1870-2014,” Correlates of War Project Trade Data 
Set Codebook, Version 4.0, (2016), https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/ (accessed 11 Mar 
2020). 
54 Singh & Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
48, No. 6, (Dec 2004), pp. 859-885. DOI: 10.1177/0022002704269655. 
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the proliferator’s motive expands further into the domestic politics or norms 
model according to Sagan’s definitions,55 it is considered as having multiple 
sources of proliferation motive (Each state’s proliferation model displayed in 
Appendix, [Table 2] “Proliferation motives of States”). The classification of 
each nation’s model status takes advantage of existing academic works on 
the state’s source of nuclear arms proliferation.56 Other determinants 
considered to be influential by sanctions scholars: the type of sanctions57, 
regime types,58 and the phase of development59 were not included in the 
calculation due to research restraints. The limitations will be elaborated in the 
latter portion of the study. 
Finally, the second quantitative analysis model utilizes eight historical cases 
out the list of 27 proliferator states where nuclear nonproliferation sanctions 
were involved: India (1998), Iran (1999), Iraq (1990), Libya (1979), North 
Korea (2006), Pakistan (1998), South Africa (1977), and Syria (2005). Like the 
 
55 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 57-63. 
56 Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Pakistani models were categorized to possess other 
rationales beyond external security; Ibid; Jacques Hymans, “Assessing North Korean Nuclear 
Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 8, (2008), pp. 
259-292; Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security 
Studies, 2:3-4, (1993), pp. 192-212, DOI: 10.1080/09636419309347524; Etel Solingen, “The 
Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing ‘Fence-sitters’ in the Post-Cold War Era,” 
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 8, (Oct 1998). 
57 Biersteker & Bergeijk, “How and When do Sanctions work? The Evidence,” in On target? 
EU sanctions as security policy tools, ed. Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, (2015), pp. 15-28. 
58 Aurther A. Stein, "Sanctions, inducements, and market power," in Sanctions Statecraft, and 
Nuclear Proliferation, ed. Etel Solingen, Cambridge University Press, (2012), pp. 54-55. 
59 Miyagawa and Ohno, “Nuclear Bombs and Economic Sanctions,” Southern Economic 
Journal, Vol. 82, No. 2, (Oct 2015), pp. 635-646. 
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previous model, the nuclear arms acquisition status is the independent 
variable for Model 2-1, and the “Indicators of Nuclear Proliferation” is the 
independent variable for Model 2-2. 
Unlike the first model in which both regressions demonstrated similar 
implications, only Model 2-1 displayed statistically significant outputs. Model 
2-1 first shows that the higher level of the target’s economic interdependence 
on the global market is correlated with the lower chance of nuclear 
proliferation when economic sanctions are applied. Secondly, the model also 
demonstrates that the target’s motivation behind its weapons program is 
limited to the security concerns has a positive correlation with a lower 
likelihood of its nuclear arms acquisition. Plus, one noticeable outcome from 
the analyses is that the variables estimated crucial, such as GDP, coercion 
being multilateral natured, and duration, exhibited statistically insignificant 
influence on the independent variables. 
To summarize, by using multivariate regression analysis on historical 
records of economic coercion in counter-proliferation issues, the research 
verifies that the use of sanctions is not correlated with a higher probability of 
deterring nuclear arms programs. The second set of regression judges that 
the degree of a target’s integration into the international economy and its 
sources of proliferation are the most significant determinants. To further 
analyze the impact of economic interdependence and the proliferation 
motives, the next portion of this research examines two case studies to verify 
their significance qualitatively. 
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Nuclear Sanctions: Qualitative Analysis 
i) Economic Interdependence 
For qualitative analysis of the target’s interdependence with the global 
economy, the research looks into the sanction regimes placed on the DPRK. 
The DPRK had the one of the lowest trade / GDP ratio of 12.83%60 as of 
2006 when the UN re-initiated sanctions as a response to Pyongyang’s 
clandestine uranium enrichment (HEU) program and 2006 nuclear testing.61 
As the main objective of economic coercion is to alter the target’s policy 
calculation by raising the perceived cost of a nuclear arms program,62 the 
target’s low level of international economic integration represents lower 
efficacy by limiting the coercer’s lack of leverage over the target’s economy. In 
the case of 2006 North Korea, such implication indicates that the implemented 
sanctions were only able to influence 12.83% of its market at maximum. 
However, the low level of economic interdependence imposes more 
obstacles to successful sanctions applications than the pure amount of 
leverage provided in the initial stages. The level of financial liberalization and 
international integration also affects the perception of interest, thus shaping 
 
60 Calculated by the author using: World Bank, “GDP (Current US$),” Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, (assessed 11 Mar 2020); Barbieri & 
Keshk, “International Trade: 1870-2014,” Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set 
Codebook, Version 4.0, (2016), https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/ (accessed 11 Mar 
2020). 
61 Jonathan D. Pollack, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015,” in Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, ed. Busch & Joyner, University of Georgia Press, (2009), pp. 
263-280. 
62 Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With Examples from 
the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
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the nuclear posture as a response to the external coercion placed on a 
proliferating state.63 Despite DPRK’s concentration on the “Military First” 
diplomacy64, there are signs that North Korea’s low level of economic 
interdependence is making itself even more ignorant of the economic 
damage. Even after the initial economic sanctions in 2006, DPRK’s economic 
interdependence ratio and the absolute amount steadily grew until 2014 and 
maintained a similar level in 2015.65 
However, after the 2016 Punggye-ri hydrogen bomb testing and the launch 
of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite, the South Korean government closed the 
Kaesong industrial complex that represents the economic connection between 
Seoul and Pyongyang commenting that “assistance and the efforts of our 
government … upgrading North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range 
missiles”.66 In addition, several new sanctions were imposed on DPRK’s 
economy, including UNSC’s resolution 2321 restricting Pyongyang’s primary 
export source, including coal, copper, nickel, silver, and other natural 
resources.67 As a result, DPRK’s economic interdependence dwindled by 
 
63 Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” in Going Nuclear, ed. Brown et 
al., MIT Press, (2009), pp. 36-77. 
64 Hoon Suh, “A Study on North Korea’s Military-First Diplomacy: From the perspective of a 
small-weak state’s coercive diplomacy towards the US,” The institute of North Korean 
Studies, Dongguk University, Vol. 3 (2), (2007), pp.103-147. 
65 Kwan Kyo Lee, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2018,” Bank of 
Korea, (Jul 2019); Park and Walsh, “Stopping North Korea, Inc: Sanctions Effectiveness and 
Unintended Consequences,” MIT Security Studies Program, (Aug 2016), pp. 20-22. 
66 Justin McCurry, “Seoul shuts down joint North-South Korea industrial complex,” The 
Guardian, (10 Feb 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/10/seoul-shuts-down-
joint-north-south-korea-industrial-complex-kaesong, (accessed 15 Mar 2020). 
67 UN Security Council, “Resolution 2321,” S/RES/2321, (2016). 
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15% in total trade volume and 37.2% in export revenues, inflicting a 
considerable amount of damage by the use of financial coercion.68 
Nevertheless, the outcomes were not articulated as expected. After DPRK’s 
dramatic retreat in international commerce, Pyongyang began doubling down 
its nuclear weapons program. In comparison to its previous history of 
conducting nuclear-related experiments 2-3 times a year, DPRK conducted 
five additional testings related to nuclear missile technology just in 2016,69 
including the second Punggye-ri nuclear experiment announced to be 
successful ballistic missile testing with a mounted nuclear warhead.70 
Although these aggressive nuclear postures are also the results of diplomatic 
collisions along with external threats, the effect of North Korea’s low 
engagement in the international economy on its internal decision-making 
calculation should be accounted for. 
Another major obstacle created by the low level of economic integration is 
the tendency of trade partner concentration. That is, when the target’s 
economic interdependence is relatively small, the nation can seek to minimize 
 
68 North Korean Economy Watch, “International sanctions to reported to hit DPRK economy 
harder,” (28 Feb 2018); Chang ku Kang, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea 
in 2017,” Bank of Korea, (Jul 2018). 
69 BBC, “North Korea tests long-range missile engine,” (9 Apr 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36002713, (accessed 13 Mar 2020); Kwon and 
Cullinane, “US detects failed North Korean ballistic missile launch,” CNN (16 Oct 2016), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/15/asia/failed-north-korea-missile-launch/index.html, 
(accessed 14 Mar 2020); Sang-hun Choe, “5 Days After Failed Missile Test by North Korea, 
Another Failure,” The New York Times, (19 Oct 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/asia/north-korea-musudan-missile-failure.html, 
(accessed 13 Mar 2020). 
70 Choe, and Perlez, “North Korea Tests a Mightier Nuclear Bomb, Raising Tension,” The 
New York Times, (8 Sep 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/asia/north-korea-
nuclear-test.html, (accessed 15 Mar 2020). 
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the inflicted damage by condensing their commerce volume on the partners 
less affected by the financial coercion, rather than complying with the 
pressure. As DPRK’s economy was interconnected with only a handful 
number of other states like China and Russia at the time of sanctions 
application, Pyongyang focused on trading with the partners less complaint of 
the sanction regime to minimize the economic damage.71  
 




71 Haggard, and Noland, “Engaging North Korea: the efficacy of sanctions and inducements,” 
in Going Nuclear, ed. Brown et al., MIT Press, (2009), pp. 232-260. 









As observed from Figure 1 above, the amount of trade between North 
Korea and China increased over time despite the multilateral sanctions and 
UNSC resolutions enacted in 2006. Russia is another state mostly unaffected 
by the counter-proliferation sanctions on DPRK. Russia is second to only 
China when it comes to the trade volume with the DPRK. Although Figure 2 
demonstrates a steady decrease over time, the DPRK-Russia trade volume 
remained constant. 
 
[Figure 2] DPRK-Russia Trade Data73 
 
 







Finally, Figure 3 shows DPRK’s total global trade volume over ten years, 
beginning in the year 2007 when the international nonproliferation sanctions 
initiated. Not only does the data represent an overall increase in North Korean 
commerce activity, but it also displays a nearly identical trend to Figure 1, 
DPRK-China trade data. Such implication suggests that DPRK’s 
concentration on the invulnerable partners, led other economic exchanges 
negligible, significantly undermining the influence of financial nonproliferation 
efforts. 
 
[Figure 3] DPRK International Trade Data74 
 
  In the end, the above data demonstrate the North Korea’s low economic 
connectivity damaging the efficacy of the nonproliferation sanctions in two 
 







ways. First, by driving the Pyongyang’s decision-makers ignorant of the 
financial losses, and second, by incentivizing DPRK to concentrate their 
remaining international trade volume on the states less influenced by the 
sanctions regime. Although these two mechanisms may not operate the same 
way in every instance of proliferation, they illustrate the process of how the 





ii) Proliferation Motive 
The proliferation motives are other core variables in explaining the 
interaction between economic sanctions and counter-proliferation. The 
perceived existence of a significant external threat is a prerequisite condition 
for a nuclear arms program.75 Every state’s pursuit of the atomic weapon 
began with the belief that the acquisition of this strategic arm will guarantee its 
vital interests in the anarchical international system. Be it Stockholm and Bern 
calculating ways to secure their holdings in the European continent, or 
Islamabad and Tehran pursuing to offset regional rivals’ nuclear advantage, 
the political consideration of going nuclear is born out of some level of security 
concerns. 
However, not all the states that have considered nuclear arms alternative 
end up acquiring atomic weapons. Factors other than external threats must 
reinforce the decision to proliferate for the program to achieve its goal. In this 
sense, the expansion of proliferation into internal political and normative 
sources can severely impair the efficacy of nonproliferation sanctions. The 
domestic politics model supports the state’s proliferation by having influential 
figures in science, security, and political sectors believe that nuclear weapons 
will promote their interest.76 On the other hand, the norms model does so by 
anchoring the belief that going nuclear is a rational behavior according to the 
 
75 Monteiro & Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 
39, No. 2, (Fall 2014), pp.7-51, doi:10.11.1192/ISEC_a_00177. 
76 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 54-86. 
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state’s national identity, into the public and the leadership.77 
The proliferation of India illustrates how the domestic political source of 
proliferation contributes to the state’s higher willingness to possess nuclear 
arms. Multiple pieces of evidence support the Indian politicians’ and scientists’ 
internal influence in the Indian proliferation process. To begin with, India’s 
regional nuclear threat, the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, did not result in an 
immediate response nor consensus within New Delhi. Instead, there were 
constant bureaucratic struggles between those in favor of the weapons 
program, namely Homi Bhabba, the head of Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), and those against it, such as Prime Minister Shastri.78 Notably, Prime 
Minister Shastri was skeptical of the nuclear development’s practical value 
because he expected its cost to be overly burdensome for the Indian 
economy. Nevertheless, AEC’s continuous lobbying on the pro-nuclear party 
in Congress pressured the Indian government to pursue a secret atomic 
weapons project, though the decision was renounced shortly.79 A few years 
later, in the early 1970s, AEC’s leadership once again reached out to Gandhi, 
the Indian Prime Minister at the time, whose administration was suffering from 
internal turmoil and lack of domestic support. Seeing this as an opportunity to 
bolster the public support,80 she approved the ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ 
 
77 Ibid. 
78 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, (Winter 1996-1997), No. 3. pp. 65-69. 
79 Shyam Bhatia, “India’s Nuclear Bomb,” Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, (1979), pp. 
120-122 
80 Leonardo S. Milani, “Comparing India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Policies During 
43 
 
claimed by AEC. By providing the Indian public with a nationalist political 
consensus, the explosion contributed to Gandhi and the ruling party’s 
recovery in support immediately.81 
The North Korean case specifically shows non-security sources of 
proliferation undermining the impact of sanctions. Two of the most influential 
political and bureaucratic groups in the DPRK, the Korean Workers Party 
(KWP) and the National Defense Commission (later replaced by State Affairs 
Commission), have the most significant influence over the missile 
development and at the same time benefit the most out of it.82 Specifically, 
the nuclear arms acquisition profits the North Korean leadership in terms of 
generating nationalistic prestige that connects to enhanced domestic support 
on the regime, not to mention its security guarantee against external threats.83 
In this sense, some scholars suggest that counter-proliferation sanctions may 
even allow the target to blame the coercers of domestic suffering.84 Such 
‘rally round the flag’ sentiments can be detrimental to the efficacy of the 
sanctions because it lowers the political cost of proliferation when the very 
objective of the sanction is to change the target’s behavior through raising its 
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83 Ibid, pp. 1-5. 
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Moreover, Kim’s regime (including previous Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il) fall 
under the “Oppositional nationalist,” according to Hyman’s NIC concept.85 
This indicates that fear and pride are what drives the North Korean leadership 
to pursue nuclear weapons as their natural response to relieve the anxiety 
and assure autonomy.86 Likewise, all three leaders of the DPRK have 
constantly indoctrinated the North Korean public through the ideology of 
‘Juche’ (Self-Reliance) and ‘Kangsongdaeguk’ (Powerful State).87 These 
attempts anchor the “Oppositional nationalist” beliefs that justify their nuclear 
development, reducing the domestic unrest, even when the economic 




85 Hyman’s NIC concept is explained in the literature review section of this research; Jacques 
E. C. Hymans, “The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign 
Policy,” Cambridge University Press, (2006). 
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New Approach,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 8, (2008), pp. 259-292. 
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reliance-experts-urge-pressuring-elites, (accessed 17 Mar 2020); Danial A. Pinkston, 
“Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, (Summer 2003), pp. 10-11. 
88 Johan Galtung claims that the purpose of sanction is to cause adequate economic damage 
which results economic / political disintegration, and later political instability. He argues that 
this political instability is what makes the target government comply with the economic 
coercion; Johan Galtung, “On the effects of International Economics Sanctions: With 
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Apr 1967), pp. 378-416. 
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Results and Discussion 
The results of this research indicate that the target’s level of economic 
interdependence and its sources of proliferation are the most significant 
determinants of the success of counter-proliferation sanctions. Such findings 
do not match with the hypothesis of this study, with only two of the original 
determinants proven statistically significant. To contribute to the existing 
nuclear sanctions discussion, this study first assembles the prominent 
contributing factors from existing pieces of literature on nuclear proliferation 
and economic coercion. Then, the study empirically verifies them, using both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
For a detailed view of the results, the lower level of economic 
interdependence diminishes the efficacy of the nonproliferation sanctions by 
limiting its range of influence and shaping the decision-making actors to be 
less influenced by economic measures. Thus, the lower dependence on the 
global market also enables the target to concentrate its connections on 
partners less affected by the imposed set of sanctions, when economic 
coercion is applied. Similarly, the diversification of the proliferation motivations 
undermines the impact of sanctions by lowering the political damage (social 
unrest) caused by the economic pressure or even taking advantage of the 
coercion to gain political integration by taking advantage of the domestic 






As a response to the prevalent skepticism over economic sanction’s 
efficacy, many scholars suggested conditions in which the financial coercions 
can operate more successfully. However, since nuclear proliferation is a realm 
with a high level of uncertainty and extremity, the research intended to 
empirically verify what the determinants with significant influence are when 
the sanctions are intended for counter-proliferation. Through the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, the author was able to find that the target state’s 
lower degree of economic interdependence and diverse source of nuclear 
intentions undermine the efficacy of sanctions, contributing to a lower 
probability of successful nuclear sanctions regime. 
Because such factors are demand-side variables, there are not many 
conventional options for the US or the international society to ensure the 
effectiveness of nuclear sanctions, aside from selecting targets with favorable 
conditions in terms of interdependence and its proliferation rationale. 
However, if there is to be an actionable policy suggestion from this research, 
there are two implications. First, keep potential proliferators engaged in 
international commerce with diverse trade partners, especially with pro-
liberalist actors. Estimating the next generation of potential proliferators from 
the geopolitical conditions and maintaining their global economic connectivity 
can drive the target’s domestic actors toward liberalism, as well as guarantee 
the efficacy of the financial coercions when they are applied. Second, remind 
the international community of the fact that exercising comprehensive 
sanctions immediately on a new proliferator may reinforce their nuclear arms 
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decision by raising their domestic support. To prevent the undesired 
consequences, the coercer must always assess the possible amount of 
political disintegration brought about by the financial measure, in addition to 
what aspect of the receiver should be targeted to cause the political instability. 
Finally, although the research strived to fill in the gap of counter-proliferation 
sanctions, there still exist several limitations to this study. The first limitation of 
this research is that it does not account for several influential determinants 
among the sanction scholars. The variables not explained in the study are the 
regime types, type of sanctions, and the phase of development. Target’s 
regime type is not included in the analysis because most nations under 
nuclear sanctions are autocratic, undermining the validity of the statistical 
analysis. The type of sanctions and the phase of development were discarded 
due to the difficulty of defining the sub-categories while adhering to the theme 
of this research. For instance, a nuclear sanctions regime typically combines 
targeted sanctions on core interest groups and comprehensive sanctions on 
the receiver’s industry, thus gauging the efficacy of each measure requires 
separate research on its own. 
The influence of a hegemonic supporter is another limitation of this 
research. The presence of hegemonic power supporting the sanctioned target 
has an immense interactive effect on the relationship between the dependent 
variables (determinants), and the independent variable (outcomes of nuclear 
sanction). Typically, determinants involving the international system such as 
‘multilateral pressure’ and ‘economic interdependence’ display different levels 
of validity and significance depending on the presence of hegemonic 
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supporters. However, because defining the amount of hegemonic 
engagement does not belong within the scope of this study,89 the study of this 
interactive relationship between the presence of hegemonic support and other 
determinants is left for future research. 
  
 
89 Such consideration includes: how much investment from a hegemon should be the 
standard of being involved? How to assess political and diplomatic supports? Can the 
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